Since its introduction, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), or "neural decoding", has 7 transformed the field of cognitive neuroscience. Underlying its influence is a crucial inference, 8 which we call the Decoder's Dictum: if information can be decoded from patterns of neural 9 activity, then this provides strong evidence about what information those patterns represent. 10
Since its introduction, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA)-or informally, neural 34 'decoding'-has had a transformative influence on cognitive neuroscience. Methodologically, it 35 is a veritable multi-tool that provides a unified approach for analyzing data from cellular 36 recordings, fMRI, EEG, and MEG, which can also be paired with computational modeling and 37 behavioral paradigms (Kriegeskorte et al. [2008] ). Theoretically, it is often presented as a means 38 for investigating the structure and content of the brain's population code, thereby unifying 39 psychological and neuroscientific explanations while predicting behavioral performance (Haxby 40 et al. [2014] ; Kriegeskorte and Kievet [2013] ). More ambitiously still, decoding methods are 41 advertised as a means of 'reading' the brain and 'listening' in on the mind ( The Decoder's Dictum should interest philosophers for two reasons. First, a central philosophical 51 issue with neuroimaging is its use in 'reverse inferences' about mental function (Poldrack 52 [2006]; Klein [2010] ). The Decoder's Dictum is a similar but more nuanced form of inference, so 53 it deserves careful scrutiny. Second, decoding results are some of the most compelling in 54 cognitive neuroscience, and offer a wellspring of findings that philosophers may want to tap into 55 when defending theoretical claims about the architecture of the mind and brain. 1 It is therefore 56 worth clarifying what decoding can really show. 57 58 We argue that the Decoder's Dictum is false. The Dictum is underwritten by the idea that 59 uncovering information in neural activity patterns, using 'biologically plausible' MVPA methods 60 that are similar to the decoding procedures of the brain, is sufficient to show that this information 61 is neurally represented and functionally exploitable. However, as we are typically ignorant of the 62 precise information exploited by these methods, we cannot infer that the information decoded is 63 the same information the brain exploits. Thus decodability is not (by itself) a reliable guide to 64 neural representation. Our goal is not to reprimand neuroscientists for how they currently employ 65 and interpret MVPA. Rather, what follows will clarify the conditions under which decoding 66 could provide evidence about neural representation. 67 68 By analogy, consider research on brain-machine interface (BMI) systems, which use decoding to 69 generate control signals for computer cursors or prosthetic limbs (Hatsopolous and Donoghue 70 [2009] ). Largely because of BMI's engineering and translational objectives, however, little 71 attention is paid to the biological plausibility of decoding methods. Consequently, BMI research 72 does not involve inferences about neural function based on decodability. We believe that, 73 epistemically, decoding in cognitive neuroscience is typically no better off than in BMI research, 74 and so forms a thin basis for drawing inferences about neural representation. 75 76 Our focus is on how MVPA is used to investigate neural representations. Since talk of 77 representation is itself philosophically contentious, we assume a relatively lightweight notion 78 that is consistent with usage in the relevant sectors of neuroscience: a representation is any 79 internal state of a complex system that serves as a vehicle for informational content and plays a 80 functional role within the system based on the information that it carries (Bechtel [1998] ). 2 As 81 we shall see, some researchers talk of decoding mental representations. We assume they have in 82 mind at least the notion of (distributed) internal representation we have articulated, so our 83 arguments apply to their claims as well. 84
85
We focus on neural representations that take the form of population codes. A population code 86 represents information through distributed patterns of activity occurring across a number of 87 neurons. In typical population coding models, each individual neuron exhibits a distribution of 88 responses over some set of inputs, and for any given input, the joint or combined response across 89 the entire neural population encodes information about the input parameters (Pouget et al. 90 [2000]). 91 92 2 One may reasonably wonder whether this characterization captures scientific usage. Although foundational concepts like 'representation' are rarely explicitly defined by neuroscientists, there are exceptions. For example, Marr ([1982] , pp. 20-1) defines a representation as 'a formal system for making explicit certain entities or types of information', and Eliasmith and Anderson ([2003] , p. 5) state that: '[r]epresentations, broadly speaking, serve to relate the internal state of the animal to its environment; they are often said to "stand-in for" some external state of affairs.' Along similar lines, deCharms and Zador ([2000] , p. 614) define a representation as a 'message that uses […] rules to carry information' and define content as the 'information that a representation carries'. Our discussion of the theoretical basis for the Dictum (section 3.2) also illustrates that something close to the above notion is widely assumed by researchers in the field.
Our critique of the Dictum will take some setup. In section 2, we provide a brief introduction to 93 decoding methods. In section 3, we argue that the Dictum is false: the presence of decodable 94 information in patterns of neural activity does not show that the brain represents that 95 information. Section 4 expands on this argument by considering possible objections. In section 5, 96
we suggest a way to move beyond the Dictum. Section 6 concludes the paper. 97 98
A Brief Primer On Neural Decoding: Method, Application, And Interpretation 99
We begin by providing a brief introduction to basic decoding methods and their interpretation. 100
We focus primarily on research that has used MVPA with fMRI to investigate the visual system. 101
There are three reasons for this narrow focus. First, decoding research on vision is largely 102 responsible for popularizing MVPA. Second, it has also driven many of the methodological 103 innovations in the field. Third, it is instructive because we have a detailed understanding of the 104 functional organization of many visual brain regions along with good psychophysics (Haxby 105 [2012] [2006]), which we will illustrate via a simple (hypothetical) fMRI experiment. In this 112 experiment, fMRI BOLD responses are measured while participants view two gratings of 113 different orientations over a number of trials ( Figure 1A ). The goal of the experiment is to test 114 whether the activity patterns elicited in response to the two stimulus conditions can be 115 differentiated. 116
117
The first step of analysis, pattern measurement, involves collecting neuroimaging data that 118 reflects condition-dependent patterns of activity. This step has a number of components, 119 including performing the actual recordings and preprocessing of the activity-dependent signal. 120
Our example uses fMRI, but other techniques (for example, EEG, MEG, or cellular recordings) 121 could also be employed. As in all fMRI experiments, we must make certain assumptions about 122 the connection between the recorded signals and underlying neural activity. 4 Nevertheless, the 123 end result is the same: a set of data consisting of multiple distinct measurements of activity 124 occurring during each experimental condition. 125
126
The second step, pattern selection, involves focusing in on a subset of the measured signals for 127 further analysis. With fMRI, this involves a subset of all voxels or a 'region of interest' (ROI). 128
ROIs can be defined anatomically (using connectivity patterns or architectonic criteria) and/or 129 defined functionally (using neural response profiles or more traditional univariate fMRI 130 analyses). Pattern selection also depends on experimenter goals and recording technique. In our 131 experiment ( Figure 1B ) the ROI is parafoveal primary visual cortex (V1), defined anatomically 132 (Benson et al. [2012] ). 133
134
The third, and crucial, step is pattern classification. Pattern classification allows one to measure 135 the discriminability of different patterns in multivariate data. For example, in our experiment we 136 want to see if the patterns of BOLD activity in parafoveal V1 for our two stimulus conditions can 137 be distinguished ( Figure 1C ). A number of classification methods are available. The simplest is 138 to divide the data in half for each stimulus condition and compute the within-and between-class 139 correlations of the patterns (Haxby et al. [2001] ). If the patterns are discriminable, the within-140 class correlation should be higher. 141 142 A more powerful (and widely used) technique employs machine learning classifiers, which treat 143 each element of the patterns of interest (e.g., each voxel) as a separate dimension, or 'feature', in 144 4 It is well-known that the signals measured with neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI and MEG/EEG depend on neural activity, but often in complicated and indirect ways (e.g., Logothetis [2008] ; Nir et al. [2008] ; Singh [2012] ). For example, fMRI measures blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals reflecting changes in cerebral blood flow (CBF), cerebral blood volume (CBV), and cerebral metabolic rate of oxygen consumption (CMRO 2 ) following neural activity. Although it remains controversial precisely which types of neural responses induce these haemodynamic changes (e.g., Logothetis et al. [2001] ; Sirotin and Das [2009] ; Lee et al. [2010] ), applications of MVPA typically assume that neuroimaging techniques coarsely measure the spatial structure and temporal dynamics of local neuronal populations. It is therefore common to use the term 'activity patterns' to describe the multivariate data collected with these techniques, even though, strictly speaking, MVPA is not being used to analyse neural activity patterns directly. We also adopt this convention. a high-dimensional space. Assuming our ROI includes N voxels, then each trial-wise stimulus 145 presentation elicits a pattern that occupies a point in an N-dimensional neural activation space. 146
The goal of the classifiers is to find a way to transform this high-dimensional space into one 147
where the voxel patterns associated with each condition are separable by a decision boundary 148 ( Figure 1D ). 149 150 Although a rich variety of classifiers are available, usually simple linear classifiers are used for 151 MVPA because they provide a principled means of estimating a linear boundary between classes 152 in activation space. To avoid overfitting, the decision boundary is estimated for a subset of the 153 data designated as 'training' data, and the classifier is subsequently 'tested' on the remaining 154 data ( Figure 1D ). The classifier assigns condition labels for the training data based on the 155 position of the activity patterns relative to the decision boundary. The performance of the 156 classifier is then a function of the accuracy of its label assignments (for example, % correct; 157 Figure 1D ). Training and testing is done multiple times, with each data partition taking its turn as 158 the testing data, and the performance of the classifier is then averaged across iterations. If the 159 mean classifier performance is statistically better than chance, the patterns for the different 160 conditions are considered to be discriminable. Although applications are typically far more 161 complex than what we have presented here, at root all decoding analyses make use of either 162 correlations or machine learning classifiers. 163 164
The informational benefits of MVPA 165
Before we turn to the Dictum, it is worth considering the advantages of MVPA over more 166 traditional univariate analysis methods. To do this we adapt a distinction from Kriegeskorte and 167 Bandettini ([2007] ) between activation-based and information-based analyses of neuroimaging 168 data. Activation-based analysis involves spatially averaging activity across all voxels within a 169
given ROI, yielding a single measure of overall regional activation to correlate with the tested 170 conditions. By contrast, information-based analysis looks for a statistical dependency between Pratte [2012] ). Hence, what distinguishes the two approaches is whether or not they are sensitive 174 to spatial patterns in fMRI data. Information-based approaches are so-called because they are 175 sensitive to information contained in these spatial patterns. In contrast, the spatial averaging at 176 the heart of activation-based analyses obscures this information. 177
178 All MVPA methods are information-based. Consequently, whatever the status of the Dictum, 179
MVPA decoding holds an advantage over most univariate methods because it offers more 180 spatially sensitive dependent measures. Demonstrating that information is present in activity 181 patterns is also likely to have greater functional significance given the widely held assumption 182 that the brain is an information-processing system that uses population coding to implement its 183 internal representations (Pouget et al. [2000] ; Panzeri et al. [2015] ). For example, in fMRI 184 research, activation-based methods are often used to infer that a brain region is involved in some 185 mental process given its engagement during an experimental condition. But as a dependent 186 measure, mean BOLD activity itself likely has no obvious functional significance. Similarly, the 187 evoked responses that are the focus of traditional EEG and MEG analysis are not signals that the 188 brain itself processes. In contrast, if the brain uses population codes, searching for information in 189 patterns of activation means looking for the currency in which the brain makes its transactions. to isolate the 'fusiform face area' (FFA) within the temporal cortex, which had been interpreted 194 as a highly specialized face-processing 'module' in the ventral visual stream (Kanwisher et al. 195 [1997] ). Haxby et al. used MVPA to show that face information was discriminable in the ventral 196 stream even when FFA was removed from the analysed ROI. Hence, their results demonstrated 197 that decoding methods could reveal information present in brain activity that was otherwise 198 undetectable by traditional methods. The results of Haxby et al. not only illustrated the greater 199 sensitivity of decoding methods, but also made explicit the idea that decoding was potentially 200 useful for revealing distributed representations in the brain. 201
202
In summary, univariate 'activation-based' analyses often obscure the information latent in spatial 203 patterns of neural activity, while decoding affords a powerful tool for revealing this information. 204
If the brain uses population codes, then spatial patterns in neural data that differentiate between 205 conditions should be recoverable using information-based MVPA methods. 206 207
Why The Decoder's Dictum Is False 208
Significant decoding indicates that information is latent in patterns of neural activity. However, 209 researchers often draw a further inference: if there is decodable information, then there is strong 210 evidence that the information is represented by the patterns of activity used as the basis for the 211 decoding. stimuli were presented in the periphery, but only one was attended to, this resulted in greater 230 classification accuracy for the orientation of the attended stimulus. Both of these results were 231 interpreted as providing evidence of attention-driven feedback to primary visual cortex. In 232 another study, Kok et al. ([2012] ) found that when the orientation of a grating corresponded with 233 an observer's expectations, this resulted in lower BOLD activity but higher classification 234 accuracy. Again, the focus was on showing that early visual processing can be modulated by 235 expectations. Finally, Harrison and Tong ([2009] ) found that stimulus information in a working 236 memory task could be decoded from V1 over a prolonged period of time, suggesting a 237 recruitment of the region for preserving stimulus information for later recall. The common goal 238 of these studies is to reveal facts about functional processing or localization, not representational 239
content. 240 241
In what follows, we defend the strong claim that the Decoder's Dictum is false: successful 242 decoding of information does not provide reasonable grounds for the inference that patterns of 243 neural activity represent the conditions (or aspects of the conditions) about which they carry 244 information. For some philosophers, this might sound like a trivial point: of course we cannot 245 make inferences from information to representation, as there is more to representation than 246 merely carrying information. Fair enough. Yet the problem is not (just) that informational 247 content comes too cheaply in comparison to representational content (Fodor [1984] ). For even if 248 we accept that neural representations have content that is partially, or wholly, determined by 249 information, there are several reasons for thinking that the Dictum fails to hold. In the rest of this 250 section, we argue that a fundamental methodological issue with MVPA-specifically, the 251 uncertainty regarding the information exploited by linear classifiers-shows why the Dictum is 252 false. 253 254
We don't know what information is decoded 255
The Dictum entails that if a classifier can discriminate between conditions, then it is picking up 256 on the same information encoded by underlying neural representations. The problem is that we 257 rarely know what information a classifier actually relies on. Indeed, this is most obvious in cases 258 where we know a good deal about what a brain region represents. 259
260
To illustrate, consider again V1, where we have a reasonably good understanding of how 261 orientation information is encoded (see, for example, Priebe and Ferster [2012] ). Orientation-262 related information is also highly decodable using fMRI and MVPA (Haynes and Rees [2005] ; 263 Kamitani and Tong [2005] ). And yet, we do not know what information classifiers are extracting 264 from this region. Indeed, it is something of a mystery why fMRI decoding in the region even 265 works at all. A typical voxel during a functional scan has a much coarser spatial resolution (> 2 x 266 2 x 2 mm) than the scale of the cortical columns that code for orientation in this region (~2 mm 267 in humans; ~ 1 mm in monkeys). This means that one plausible explanation about how decoding 268 works-that patterns of activity across orientation columns occur at a spatial scale roughly 269 commensurate with the resolution of fMRI-cannot be correct. 270
271
There are a number of competing hypotheses about how orientation decoding in V1 is possible. 272 Imperfect sampling of the underlying orientation columns might result in small biases at the 273 voxel level, which decoding exploits, resulting in 'hyperacuity' or sub-voxel resolution (Haynes 274 and Rees [2005] ; Kamitani and Tong [2005] ). Another possibility is that biases in the retinotopic 275 map in V1 (in particular, radial biases) enable successful orientation decoding (Mannion et al. 276 [2009]; Freeman et al. [2011] ). Yet a third possibility is that activity patterns elicited by stimulus 277 edges, not sampling or retinotopic biases, provide a potential source of decodable information in 278 V1 (Carlson [2014] ). Note here that the 'biases' appealed to in the explanations of orientation 279 decoding are (in some important sense) artifacts in the way the data presented to the classifier is 280 structured, rather than deep facts about the representational structure of the brain. So long as 281 there is any information that distinguishes the conditions at hand, a linear decoder stands a good 282 chance of finding it. 283 284 These issues are not restricted to decoding orientation in V1. For instance, it has been found that 285 motion information decoding is more robust in V1 than V5/MT+ (Kamitani and Tong Thus, the fact that decoding can pick up on information unused by the brain, even in regions 295 where there is a suitable representation that is used (for example, orientation representation in 296 V1), means that even when prior theory and decoding are in agreement, decoding results cannot 297 be reliably interpreted as picking up on the information that is neurally represented and used. All 298 the worse, then, when we do not have converging evidence and prior theory. This epistemic 299 uncertainty regarding the source of decodable information cuts to the core of the theoretical 300 rationale for the Dictum. It is for this reason it is false, as we will illustrate by reconstructing the 301 theoretical basis for the Dictum. Although appeals to the Dictum are commonplace in research 302 using MVPA (a point we will return to), the theoretical basis for the Dictum is often 303 underspecified. Here we reconstruct the rationale. Doing so demonstrates why epistemic 304 uncertainty regarding the source of decodable information is fatal for the Dictum. 305 306
The theoretical basis for the dictum 307
The Decoder's Dictum licenses inferences from decodability to facts about neural representation. 308
The principle is evidential: if we can decode, we have reasonably strong evidence about what is 309 represented in the measured patterns of neural activity. But why think the Dictum is true? Here 310 we reconstruct what we take to be the underlying theoretical basis for the Dictum. 311
312
The support for the Dictum starts with two seemingly uncontroversial claims. The first is that if 313 activity patterns occurring in different experimental conditions are discriminable, then 314 information about the conditions is latent in these patterns. The second is that if activity patterns 315 represent information about an experimental condition, then there must be some way to decode 316 that content from the neural patterns. In other words, if internal representations are implemented 317 in patterns of neural activity, and the brain is an encoder and decoder of its own neural signals, 318 then the information must be decodable-that is, after all, what makes it a code. While 319 substantive, these assumptions are not enough to get us to the Dictum. For all we have said, 320 representations present in the brain might not have the right relationship to information extracted 321 by MVPA when applied to the data recorded with standard neuroimaging techniques. 322 323 Two additional steps are required. The first secures the link between information and 324 representation. This requires something like an informational approach to internal 325 representations and their content. The presence of a statistical dependency or correlation is of 326 interest because it suggests a causal dependency between the patterns and the experimental 327 conditions (cf. Dretske [1983] ). So charitably, the notion of information that researchers have in 328 mind is that of natural information, where an event caries natural information about events that 329 reliably cause it to occur (Scarantino and Piccinini [2010] ). The view, which many in the field 330 endorse, is very similar to Dretske's ([1988] ): a representation is a state that carries natural 331 information, appropriately formatted to function as a state carrying this information. 332 333 For example, Cox ([2014] , p. 189) notes that decoding research on the visual system: 334 335 implicitly recognizes that the problem of vision is not one of information content, but of 336 format. We know that the activity of retinal ganglion cells contains all of the information that 337 the visual system can act upon, and that nonlinearity and noise in neuronal processing can 338 only decrease (and never increase) the absolute amount of information present. However, the 339 information present in the firing of retinal ganglion cells is not in a format that can be easily 340 read-out by a downstream neuron in order to guide action.
342
In other words, vision repackages the information latent in the retinal input to make it 343 functionally available for downstream perceptual and cognitive processing. A simple 344 informational theory of representational content has as a corollary the idea that we can 345 distinguish between implicit and explicit information (Kirsh [1990] ), where being 'implicit' or 346 'explicit' is understood as being relative to some procedure for reading-out the information based 347 on how a code is structured. Why should we think that successful decoding allows us to make an (4) the hypothesis that biologically plausible linear classifiers are sufficiently similar in 390 architecture to the decoding procedures employed by the brain. The latter is what lets us infer 391 that decodable information is appropriately formatted for use by the brain, even when we do not 392 necessarily know what that format is. So (5): if we can decode information from patterns of 393 activity using MVPA, this provides good evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the patterns 394 represent the information. Which is just a restatement of the Dictum. 395 396
Undermining the theoretical basis 397
We are now in a position to see precisely why the Dictum is false. For starters, note that a 398 version of the Dictum appealing to nonlinear classifiers would be summarily rejected by 399 researchers, as one cannot make an inference about what information is represented by patterns 400 of neural activity using overpowered, biologically implausible nonlinear methods. For example, 401 Kamitani and Tong ([2005] , p. 684) were the first to caution against the use of nonlinear The concern is that information relied on by nonlinear classifiers might bear little relationship to 419 what is actually represented by the brain. In other words, nonlinear classifiers are too 420 informationally greedy, and so cannot serve as surrogates for the decoding procedures of the 421 brain. Hence, a version of the Dictum appealing to nonlinear classifiers would clearly be false: 422 nonlinear decoding does not provide evidence for what neural activity patterns represent. In 423 contrast, the standard version of the Dictum seems to assume that linear classifiers are relatively 424 conservative in terms of the information they can exploit (that is, they are biologically plausible), 425 and so provide a safe (if defeasible) basis for making claims about representational content. The 426 fact that a linear classifier can discriminate between activity patterns from different conditions is 427 taken to provide good evidence that information about the conditions is both latent in the brain 428 and functionally available. 429 430 Critically, our earlier discussion of the uncertainty surrounding the source of (linearly) decodable 431 information shows the flaw in this reasoning. The fact that linear classifiers are biologically 432 plausible does not preclude them from also being informationally greedy. Linear classifiers are 433 surprisingly good at finding some linear combination of input features which discriminates 434 between conditions in a multivariate data set. As we saw in our discussion of orientation 435 decoding in V1, even when we do know the underlying functional architecture, how a classifier 436 exploits information in neural data is deeply opaque. To further illustrate the greed of linear 437 classifiers, consider that in psychology some have noted that linear decision-making models can 438 be surprisingly good even when feature weightings are assigned more or less arbitrarily (Dawes 439 [1979] ). To emphasise a similar point, when using MVPA there is not even a guarantee that 440 classifiers are detecting multivariate signals. In a simulation study, Davis et al. ([2014] ) 441 produced a univariate fMRI signal that could not be detected by activation-based analyses, but 442 could nonetheless be decoded reliably. 443 444 Although a classifier (linear or nonlinear) may, through training, come to discriminate 445 successfully between activity patterns associated with different experimental conditions, the 446 information the classifier uses as the basis for this discrimination is not constrained to be the 447 information the brain actually exploits to make the distinction (that is, they are informationally 448 greedy). Importantly, it is evidence about the latter and not the former that is critical for zeroing 449 in on the contents of neural representations. Hence, decodability does not entail that the features 450 being combined, or their method of combination, bears any connection to how the brain is 451 decoding its own signals. At best, MVPA-based decoding shows that information about 452 experimental conditions is latent in neural patterns, but it cannot show that it is used, or even 453 usable, by the brain. This is the deep reason why the Dictum is false. 454 455
Objections And Replies 456
We have argued that the Decoder's Dictum is false. In this section we consider and respond to 457 some objections to our criticism. 458 459
Does anyone really believe the Dictum? 460
When criticizing inferences in cognitive neuroscience, it is common for the philosopher to be 461 informed that no working scientist really makes the sort of inference. Such an assertion is often 462 meant to be a normative claim as much as a descriptive one ('no good scientist argues thus'). Yet 463 it is the descriptive claim which really matters-for philosophical critique matters only insofar as 464 it identifies areas of actual methodological friction. (1) Kamitani and Tong ([2005] ) was one of the first studies showing that orientation 472 information is decodable from voxels in early visual cortex, including V1. They 473 state that their MVPA approach 'may be extended to studying the neural basis of 474 many types of mental content' (p. 684). 475
(2) Hung et al. ([2005] ) was one of the first studies to pair MVPA with cellular 476 recordings. They showed that object identity and category could be decoded from 477 monkey IT as soon as ~125 ms post-stimulus onset. They state that their approach 478 'can be used to characterize the information represented in a cortical area […]' (p. individual studies (1, 2, 4) and reviews (3, 5, 6), spanning most of the period that decoding 504 methods have been utilized in neuroimaging, and were written by key figures responsible for 505 developing these methods. Second, the examples span fMRI (1, 4), EEG and MEG (4), and 506 cellular recordings (2, 3). The Dictum thus appears to be a fundamental and widespread 507 assumption in cognitive neuroscience, which has arguably played a key role in popularizing 508
MVPA because of what it promises to deliver. 5 509 510
Good decoding is not enough 511
Another tempting reply to our argument goes as follows. Classifier performance is graded, so it 512 makes sense to talk about different brain regions having more or less decodable information. For 513 example, although early visual cortex contains some information about object category, 514 decodability is typically much worse than it is in inferior temporal cortex (IT), a region heavily 515 implicated in the representation of object categories (Kiani et al. [2007] ; Kriegeskorte et al. 516 [2008] ). So perhaps the Dictum is true if we restrict ourselves to the best or most decodable 517 regions. 518
519
The problem with this reply is that it faces the same objection elaborated in detail above. What 520 makes a given region the best or most decodable might have little or nothing to do with the 521 information that is available to and used by the brain. This is why decoding results can be (and 522 often are) at odds with the answers derived from other methods. As pointed out earlier, visual 523 motion is more decodable from V1 than V5/+MT using fMRI (Kamitani and Tong [2006] ; 524 Seymour et al. [2009] ), even though it is well-established that V5/+MT is a functionally 525 specialized region for representing and processing motion information. Seymour et al. ([2009] ) 526 similarly report classification accuracy of 86 % in V1 and 65 % in V5/+MT, though they 527 themselves refrain from drawing any strong conclusions due to the 'potential differences 528 underlying functional architecture in each region' (Seymour et al. [2009] , p. 178). 529
530 Their caution appears to embody the same concern that decoding results may reflect arbitrary 531 differences to which the classifier is sensitive, without guaranteeing that these results track real 532 differences in neural representation. Decoding-excellent or otherwise-is not a reliable guide to 533 representation. 534 535 Another problem with this suggestion is that it entails that poor decodability (or even failure to 536 decode) provides evidence that the information is not represented in a region. But this is false. 537
Non-significant decoding does not entail the absence of information. One might have simply 538 chosen the wrong classifier or stimuli, or the particular code used by the brain might not be read 539 out easily by a linear classifier. Dubois et al. ([2015] ) provide a nice illustration of this issue. 540
They compared single-unit recordings with fMRI decoding in the face patch system of the 541 macaque brain-an area known to possess face-sensitive neurons. In agreement with the single-542 unit data, face viewpoint was readily decodable from these regions. However, in the anterior face 543 patches, face identity could not be decoded, even though single unit data shows that it is strongly 544 Though not always carried out, the ability to connect classifier performance to behaviour has 552 been highlighted as one of the strengths of decoding methods (Naselaris et al. [2011] ). To be 553 sure, a deep problem with the Dictum is that decodability fails to show that information is 554 formatted in a way that is used, or usable, by the brain (Cox and Savoy [2003] ), while connecting 555 decoding to behaviour helps make the case for functional utilization (Tong and Pratte [2012] ). If 556 behavioural performance can be predicted from the structure present in brain activation patterns, 557 this would provide more compelling evidence that decodable information is used (or at the very 558 least usable) by the brain, and hence neurally represented. 559
560
The simplest way to connect decoding and behaviour is to show that classifier and human 561 performance are highly correlated. Minimally, if this obtains for some activation patterns more 562 than others, this provides some (relatively weak) evidence that the patterns which correlate with 563 behaviour represents information that is used in the guidance of behaviour. 564 565 Williams et al. ([2007] ) provided one of the earliest indications that not all decodable 566 information is 'read-out' in behaviour. They analysed the spatial pattern of the fMRI response in 567 specific task-relevant brain regions while subjects performed a visual shape discrimination task. 568
They hypothesized that if decodable shape category information is behaviourally relevant, then 569 decodability should be higher on correct trials than on incorrect trials. Critically, they showed 570 that although both retinotopic cortex and lateral occipital cortex (LOC) in humans contains 571 decodable category information, only the LOC shows a difference in pattern strength for correct 572 as compared to incorrect trials. Specifically, category information was decodable on correct but 573 not incorrect trials in the LOC. This was not true for retinotopic cortex. This pattern of results 574 suggests that only the information in LOC might drive behaviour. 575 576 It is also possible to quantify the relationship between decodability and behaviour more 577 precisely. For example, in an early EEG decoding study, Philiastides and Sajda ([2006] ) were 578 able to show there was no significant difference between human psychometric and classifier 579 'neurometric' functions, suggesting that the classifier performance was highly predictive of 580 observer performance when trained on time-series data of certain latencies. 581 582 While connection to behaviour supplies valuable evidence, we still think that it is not enough to 583 warrant inferences to representational content. As we noted earlier, there are cases where 584 decodability appears to show something about functional processing rather than the content of 585 neural representations. Again, V1 provides a useful test case. Since we know that V1 primarily 586 encodes information about low-level visual features (such as luminance or orientation) and does 587 not encode higher-level visual features (such as shape or object category) any decoding of 588 higher-level visual features is unlikely to reflect genuine representational content. This is true 589 even if decoded information can be linked with behavioural performance. For example, Haynes 590 and Rees ([2005] ) found that V1 activity was predictive of whether or not subjects were 591 perceiving a visual illusion, and Kok et al. ([2012] ) found that top-down effects of expectation 592 on V1 were predictive of behavioural performance. In these cases, the connection is that early 593 processing modulates later processing that determines behaviour. 594 595 Note that the problem is not one of spurious correlation. In an important sense, it is quite the 596 opposite problem. There is plenty of information, even in V1, which a clever decoding algorithm 597 can often pick up on. More generally, a brain region might carry information which is reliably 598 correlated with the information that is actually used, but which is not itself used in behaviour. 599 This is because the information in a region might need to be transformed into a more appropriate 600 format before it is read out. As DiCarlo and Cox ([2007] , p. 335) put it, '[…] the problem is 601
typically not a lack of information or noisy information, but that the information is badly 602 formatted[…]'. But even 'badly formatted' information might correlate with behaviour. In 603 summary, merely predicting behaviour using decodable information is not enough to revive the 604 Dictum. 605 606
Moving Beyond The Dictum 607
We have argued that the Decoder's Dictum is false. However, we are not pessimists about 608 decoding. Rather, we think the right conclusion to draw is that decoding must be augmented in 609 order to provide good evidence about neural representation. If linear classifiers are greedy, then 610 they cannot function as a surrogate for the sort of linear read-out carried out by the brain. 611
Instead, we need some additional assurance that a particular decoding result relies on information 612 stemming from neural representations. This need not be knock-down evidence, but decodability 613 alone is not enough to do the job (as the Dictum suggests). 614
615
In the previous section, we considered one form of augmentation-linking decoding results to 616 behavioural outcomes-and argued that it was insufficient. The problem was that linkages to 617 behaviour do not show that the information is actually formatted in a useable way. Framing it 618 this way, however, already suggests a solution. The Dictum relies on the idea that the biological 619 plausibility of linear classifiers allows them to function as a kind of surrogate-the classifier-as-620 decoder takes the place of the brain-as-decoder in showing that information that is latent in 621 neural activity is used, or usable (cf. de Wit et al. [2016] ). We have shown that it cannot play this 622
role. But if the information latent in patterns of neural activity can be used to predict observer 623 behaviour based on a psychological model, then we would have a more sound evidential basis 624 for drawing conclusions about neural representation. For unlike classifier performance, observer 625 behaviour is clearly dependent on how the brain decodes its own signals. In other words, this 626 approach depends on offering a psychologically plausible model of how observers (through 627 down-stream processing) exploit the information found in patterns of neural activity (cf. Ritchie 628 and ). And as it happens, such an approach is already on offer. 629 630 There is a long tradition in psychology of modeling behavioural performance using 631 psychological spaces (Attneave [1950] ; Shepard [1964] ). Here by 'psychological' space we mean 632 a space in which dimensions reflect different features or combinations of features of stimuli, as 633 reconstructed from comparative similarity judgments of observers of stimuli/conditions. Models 634 within this tradition characterize representations for individual stimuli or experimental conditions 635 as points in a space, and observer behaviour (such as choice or reaction time) is modeled based 636 on the relationship between different representations in these spaces. Thus, familiar 637 categorization models from cognitive psychology such as prototype models, exemplar models, 638
and decision boundary models all predict observer behaviour based on different distance metrics 639 applied to a reconstructed psychological space (Ashby and Maddox [1993] ). A virtue of some 640 MVPA methods like Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) is that they help to focus 641 attention on structure in activation spaces (Haxby et al. [2014] ; Kriegeskorte and Kievet [2013] ). 642
In RSA the pair-wise (dis)similarity for patterns of activity for different conditions is computed, 643 which can be used to reconstruct an activation space from multivariate neural data. A hypothesis 644 that many have considered is that if an activation space implements a psychological space, then 645 one can apply psychological models or hypotheses to the activation space directly in order to 646 predict behaviour (Edelman et al. [1998] [2014]). Note that this approach is importantly different from the Dictum, as it does not rely on 648 using linear classifiers as a surrogate. Furthermore, the approach achieves both biological and 649 psychological plausibility through a linkage between the structure of the decoded activation 650 space and the structure of behaviour (Ritchie and Carlson [2016] ). And since it makes use of 651 MVPA in conjunction with established techniques for modeling behaviour, it also takes 652 advantage of some of the strengths of MVPA we have already mentioned. Here we offer two 653 examples of research that adopt this sort of approach. 654 655 First, a popular and theoretically simple approach involves directly comparing the similarity 656 structure of activation spaces with psychological spaces reconstructed from subjects' similarity 657 judgments of stimuli (e.g. Mur One illustration of this approach is provided by the results of Sha et al. ([2015] ), who collected 659 similarity ratings for a large number of exemplar images for several animate or inanimate object 660 categories. The similarity space constructed from these judgments was then directly related to the 661 similarity structure of activation spaces from throughout the brain measured using fMRI. They 662 found that activation spaces that correlated with the behavioural similarity space were best 663 accounted for by a single dimension, which seemed to reflect an animacy continuum rather than 664 a categorical difference between the neural patterns for animate and inanimate objects (Kiani et showed that distance from a decision boundary for a classifier through activation space was 671
